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Abstract 
Running conventional laboratory experiments (i.e., with a standard student subject pool) is 
common practice in economic experiments, especially when methodological enquiries are 
explored. However, the generalization of the results from such experiments to the entire 
population is a highly controversial issue in the literature. In this study we investigate and 
measure warm glow motivations behind giving in charitable auctions in a conventional lab 
experiment and an artefactual field experiment (i.e., lab experiment using subjects from the 
general population). Using a novel experimental design that allows isolation of warm glow 
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from contributions motivated by pure altruism, we find that warm glow is only evident in the 
student population. Our findings cast doubt on the validity of generalizing the conclusions 
from conventional lab experiments to the general population. 
Keywords: warm glow, charitable auctions, lab experiment, WEIRDos  
JEL codes: D44, D64, C91 
 
 
Introduction 
Auctions have long been used as fundraising mechanisms for charities with numerous 
examples of celebrities’ personal items being auctioned for charitable purposes. For example, 
empirical studies on e-bay’s charitable auctions report significant charity premiums which are 
proportional to the share of the revenues donated (Elfenbein and McManus 2007). Stemming 
from similar observations, the question of what motivates individuals to voluntarily contribute 
to donations has long occupied the economic literature. Two distinct motives have been 
identified and studied; warm glow and pure altruism. The term ‘warm glow’ was first coined 
by Andreoni (1989) to describe a pure egoist deriving utility (warm glow) from the act of 
giving, like from any other private good. A pure altruist, on the contrary, is only concerned 
with the level of provision of a public good, irrespective of the method that this is financed. 
Since Andreoni’s (1989) first study, there has been ample empirical evidence of 
satisfaction being generated by the act of giving in real and hypothetical settings. Results from 
studies examining the degree of crowding out of donors’ contributions to charities due to 
government grants, dispute the long dominant neutrality theory which predicts dollar-for-dollar 
crowding out of private contributions in the presence of government donations (e.g., Andreoni 
and Payne 2010; Andreoni 2006; the latter being a detailed review of the relevant literature). 
Nunes and Schokkaert (2003) have used a list of attitudinal statements to confirm the presence 
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of warm glow incentives in a contingent valuation study. Furthermore, there is now neural 
evidence supporting the existence of warm glow motives (Harbaugh, Mayr and Burghart 
2007). Harbaugh, Mayr, and Burghart (2007) report certain neural activity taking place in areas 
known to respond to rewards when a payment to a public good is made. Consistent with the 
warm glow argument, this brain activation further increases when people make voluntary 
donations compared to mandatory tax payments. This is an indication that warm glow provides 
the giver a reward, which is higher than the benefit the giver receives from paying an 
equivalent amount of taxes. 
  However, it isn’t straightforward to distinguish warm glow incentives from pure 
altruism in laboratory experiments. Consequently the literature has focused on examining the 
fund raising properties of different auction mechanisms and on comparing the revenues 
between charitable and standard auction treatments irrespectively of the donation motivation. 
What is thus often termed warm glow in charitable auctions, and equivalently dictator and/or 
public good games, may well be confounded with pure altruism. To our knowledge, Crumpler 
and Grossman (2008) is the only study that developed a design which successfully isolated and 
measured warm glow incentives in a modified dictator game where participants were given the 
opportunity to contribute to a charity of their choice. The novelty of the design was that 
participants’ contributions were crowded out by reduced giving by the proctor, so that the 
charity would always receive a pre-set amount. Contributions were thus motivated only by 
warm glow and authors report a significant percentage (approximately 57%) of respondents 
making positive contributions. Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2011) re-examined the Crumpler and 
Grossman (2008) conclusion by applying a modified version of their original dictator game to 
assess whether warm glow measurement is confounded by altruistic feelings towards the 
experimenter. Authors added another treatment where the experimenter is the recipient of the 
giving and measured the extent of warm glow for individuals that do not display altruistic 
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feelings towards the experimenters. Their results suggest that under the Crumpler and 
Grossman (2008) design an upper bound estimate of warm glow is elicited. 
In this article we adopt the Crumpler and Grossman (2008) design to isolate and 
measure warm glow considerations in an auction that instead of giving revenues to the 
experimenter (as a standard auction does), donates revenues to a charity of participants’ choice. 
We elicit valuations for homegrown value goods under two treatments; a standard auction and 
a charitable auction. Bidding behavior is then compared across treatments to examine the 
existence of a charity premium. We are further interested in investigating whether similar 
results are obtained between different subject pools. To this respect, we conduct one set of 
sessions with a standard student pool in what constitutes a conventional lab experiment (in 
Harrison and List’s (2004) terminology) and a second set of sessions with a representative 
sample of consumers (artefactual field experiment). Our research thus also opts to contribute to 
the ongoing debate on the legitimacy of generalizing results from students to the broader 
population. Using undergraduate students for research purposes is a common practice in 
economic laboratory experiments due to students’ proximity to the experimenter, the low cost 
required for their participation and the high cognitive skills students exhibit (Feltovich 2011). 
Especially when it comes to methodological enquiries, it is very common for experimenters to 
employ students as their guinea-pigs. Falk, Meier and Zehnder (2011) report that for the time 
period 2004 to 2009, in five field journals, 89% of all subject pools consists of students. 
However, scepticism on the use of students as research surrogates for consumers or 
adults in general, is rather old (McNemar 1946; Enis, Cox, and Stafford  1972). McNemar’s 
(1946) reference to the “science of sophomores” and Cunningham, Anderson, and Murphy’s  
(1974) article bearing the provocative title “Are students real people?” are indicative. 
Reservations relate to the fact that students exhibit psychological, social and demographical 
differences from other segments of the population along with the fact that they are not yet 
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complete personalities and thus their attitudes are unstable (Harisson and List 2004; Sears, 
1986). In measuring social preferences, Levitt and List (2007) argue that human behaviour may 
be influenced by a number of factors (moral considerations, scrutiny of ones actions by others, 
context, self-selection and stakes of the game) that may differ between different subject pools 
in laboratory experiments. On the other hand there are arguments favouring the use of students 
as experimental subjects when the nature of the research is universal. As stated by Lusk and 
Shogren (2007, p46): ‘A theory is a generalization that should hold for everyone, including 
students’.  
After six decades of research the debate is still active. Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 
(2010) call the usual subject pool of experiments as WEIRDos, being an abbreviation of the 
Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic societies they live in and argue that 
generalization of the findings relied upon these subjects can be misleading since they are 
outliers of the rest of humanity. Authors review a broad literature providing evidence of 
significant variability across human population and argue that universality cannot be claimed 
not even for fundamental behavioural processes. The arguments developed triggered the 
release of a special issue in the Behavioral and Brain Sciences journal (vol. 33, Issue 2-3, 
2010) accommodating commentaries to the article and replies by the authors. The majority of 
the commentaries are supportive to the main thesis developed in the target article with authors 
agreeing on the need for research on culturally diverse, non-weird populations to permit 
generalization of the findings 
A recent strand of the literature investigates whether students participating in 
experiments behave systematically different from subjects that are drawn from the general 
population. The evidence is, however, mixed. On the one hand, students  have been found to be 
less cooperative (Burks, Carpenter, and Goette 2009; Carpenter and Seki 2011; Anderson et al. 
2010), more inclined to free-ride (Anderson et al. 2010), to exhibit different trust attitudes and 
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thus contribute less in public good experiments (Gachter, Herrmann, and Thoni  2004), to 
exhibit less loss aversion when compared to professional traders (Haigh and List 2005) and to 
be more selfish compared to workers as manifested by extremely decreasing offers in 
Ultimatum and Dictator games (Carpenter, Burks, and Verhoogen 2004). On the other hand, 
there are studies failing to find any difference between the social preferences of students and of 
subjects out of the general population (Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder 2011) or studies that report that 
differences are contingent to whether the experimental game engages other-regarding 
preferences or not (Belot, Duch, and Miller 2010).  
However, there is limited empirical evidence on the validity of extrapolating the results 
from auctions with students to the broader population. Among the exceptions, Depositario et 
al. (2009) found no significant differences in the bidding behaviour between students and the 
general population, in an auction eliciting WTP for a novel food. A similar result is reported by 
Lusk (2005) in a meta-analysis of genetically modified food valuation studies. Authors, 
however, argue that their results should be treated with caution since the relevant literature, is 
rather limited.  
Against this background, we isolate and measure warm glow considerations in 
charitable auctions and examine the validity of extrapolating results derived from a student 
pool to the broader population. To our knowledge this is the first study isolating warm glow 
motives when a charitable auction is administered. Compared to the results from standard 
auction (control) treatments, we find that the warm glow theory is verified only for the student 
sample. This finding suggests that generalization of results and conclusions from lab 
experiments with student pools, to a more general population of interest, merits greater 
attention.  
 
Experimental Design  
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The laboratory experiment was conducted in an experimental economics lab in the ... 
University of ... (Western Developed country; removed for peer review, to be adjusted upon 
publication) using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). For the consumer sessions, a 
random sample of the population of the city of AAA (capital city of the country; removed for 
peer review, to be adjusted upon publication). Recruitment was undertaken by a professional 
research company. For the student sessions, subjects were recruited by public announcements 
from the undergraduate student population of the university. We emphasize that none of the 
authors was their professor or held any other position at the university at that time. 
A variant of the Vickrey auction, a fourth-price sealed-bid auction was used to 
determine subjects’ buying price for the products in auction. The specifics of the nature of the 
experiment were not mentioned during the recruitment, but we did provide information 
regarding the provision of stochastic fees. Stochastic fees have been shown to be able to 
generate samples that are less risk averse than would otherwise have been observed (Harrison 
et al. 2009). 
Our design involved two treatments, namely a standard auction treatment and a 
charitable auction treatment. Four sessions1 (two sessions per treatment) were conducted with a 
total of 61 consumers and two sessions (one session per treatment) with a total of 36 students. 
Participants were randomly assigned into the treatments. The average duration of a session was 
about an hour and experiments were conducted in June 2010. Each session included a training 
phase and an auction phase. In the charitable auction treatment, a charity selection phase 
preceded the auction. Subjects were given prior instructions on the overall layout of the session 
and were also reminded the procedures at the beginning of each phase. 
Table 1 presents the experimental design and the number of subjects that participated in 
each treatment. We only used one proctor or monitor (i.e., one of the authors) for all sessions. 
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To further preclude experimenter bias, subjects were informed that the correspondence 
between the id number of their computer and their identity would remain unknown to the 
experimenter and to the other participants at every stage. 
Table 2 displays the socioeconomic characteristics of the subjects.  
[Table 1 here] 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The training phase 
After arriving at the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer. A computer-training 
phase was conducted for subjects in the consumer sessions that did not have previous 
experience with computers. An interactive PowerPoint application was used to familiarize 
subjects with the mouse and keyboard.  
To control for potential monetary endowment effects, subjects were told that in addition 
to their participation fee, a random amount of money was going to be assigned to each one of 
them. For consumers this amount ranged between €0.5 and €5 and for students between €0.5 
and €3. Participation fees were fixed to 20€ for consumers and 15€ for students2. Different fees 
intended to approximate what is a standard compensation fee for these subjects’ pools given 
their income and the opportunity costs they faced for participation. Everyone then received a 
random draw determining their individual-specific extra fee. We emphasized to the subjects 
that the endowment they received was private information and that they should not 
communicate this information to other subjects in the lab. All transactions were completed at 
the end of the experiment. 
Subjects initially watched a short PowerPoint presentation to familiarize them with the 
auction and procedures. The presentation included a short explanation of the fourth-price 
auction, along with a numerical example demonstrating why it is in subjects’ best interest not 
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to deviate from bidding their true value for the good under evaluation. Subjects then took a 
short computerized test regarding the procedure. The monitor explained the correct answers 
afterwards.  
 Subjects, then, bid in three practice hypothetical auction rounds for a bag of potato 
chips. The monitor emphasized that these rounds were hypothetical and that one binding round 
would be randomly chosen at the end of these rounds. A screen displayed subjects’ 
hypothetical earnings after these rounds. 
After getting fully familiarized with the auction mechanism and procedures, subjects 
bid in three real auction rounds for a chocolate bar. The monitor emphasized that these rounds 
were now real and that the highest bidders would actually pay for the products. Again, one 
round was randomly chosen as binding at the end of these rounds. A screen displayed subjects’ 
earnings after these rounds. Between rounds the only available information was whether the 
subject was one of the highest bidders or not. 
 
 
The charity organization selection phase 
This phase was only applied in the charitable auction treatment sessions (see Table 1). Subjects 
in this treatment were asked to select their favorite organization from a list of six non-
government organizations (NGOs) with the understanding that the NGO selected by most 
subjects in the session will be donated an amount of €30 by the proctor. Subjects were told that 
deposit verification will be sent to everyone’s mail address. The donation amount was 
specified to 30€ since usually this is what most NGOs request for annual membership. All 
charities were environmental NGOs and a short description from each NGOs website was 
provided to subjects (all experimental instructions, supplemental material and information 
provided to subjects are available at https://sites.google.com/site/warmglowweirdos/). The  
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charity selected by the majority was revealed only after the auction phase was through. The 
selection of the charities was made on the basis that these are equally popular among students 
and adult population. 
 
The auction phase  
In the auction phase subjects were endowed with one kilo of potatoes from a very specific 
location of the country. The region was never revealed to subjects and was called with the 
generic name “region A”. Potatoes were packed in paper bags and were labeled “Potatoes from 
region A”.  
A leaflet was then distributed to subjects that described the environmental profile of 
region A (see Appendix). In brief, the leaflet mentioned that the initial potatoes endowment 
from region A is of unknown quality due to extensive pollution of the groundwater but the 
risks for human health could not be assessed since the epidemiological study in the area of 
origin was not completed. The description accurately described region A and in fact 
epidemiologists and agronomists that study the environmental health effects of this specific 
region were advised about the content of the leaflet (see Appendix). 
Subjects were then asked to bid to exchange a kilo of potatoes from region A with a 
kilo of potatoes from region B. A second leaflet was subsequently distributed to subjects (prior 
to the actual auction) with a description of the environmental profile of region B (see 
Appendix). In brief, the leaflet described region B as being in a good ecological status (in the 
terminology of the European Water Framework Directive) and explained that this 
characterization implies that, among others, agricultural products are safe for human health. 
We made sure that potatoes from the two regions are of the same variety to avoid differences in 
appearance characteristics. Potatoes were packed in a similar paper bag and were labeled 
“Potatoes from region B”. Both potatoes are available at the market for sale but the origin was 
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not revealed to subjects to avoid regional affiliation effects. The label was the only visible 
difference between the two products. 
 To elicit subjects’ WTP, a 4th price Vickrey auction was employed. Vickrey auctions 
are demand revealing, that is, each bidder has a dominant strategy to submit a bid that 
truthfully reflects her value for the good. Lusk and Shogren (2007) provide a theoretical 
analysis of the Vickrey auction and similar uniform nth-price auctions such as the 4th price 
auction adopted in this study. Considering the size of the session groups and the likelihood of 
disengaging some of the participants due to small number of winners, the 4th price auction was 
regarded as a compromise between a 2nd price auction and an nth random price auction for 
engaging off-margin bidders. This variant of the Vickrey auction guaranteed that at least three 
subjects would exchange their initial endowments. The relatively high number of winners is 
expected to engage all bidders in auction procedure. Fourth-price Vickrey auctions are 
commonly applied in the literature (e.g., Umberger and Feuz 2004). Subjects participated in 
five consecutive rounds and were told that at the end one round would be randomly chosen as 
binding. Between rounds subjects could only observe if they were one of the highest bidders of 
the previous round or not. 
The socio-economic background of the subjects was elicited in the final phase. 
Experimental instructions are available at: https://sites.google.com/site/warmglowweirdos/. 
 
Isolation of  warm glow incentives and research hypotheses 
 
In the charitable auction sessions, subjects were additionally informed that the revenues from 
the highest bidders would be donated to the charity selected by the session’s majority on their 
behalf and a deposit receipt would be mailed to the address of the highest bidders. 
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To disentangle motives behind donations in the charity treatment we followed the 
design proposed by Crumpler and Grossman (2008). We crowded out participants donation by 
reduced giving by the proctor, so as to keep the total contribution to the charity constant at €30. 
Subjects were told that the charity would receive neither more nor less than €30 and that the 
monitor would add to the contributions by the highest bidders that much, so that the total 
amount would always sum to €30. Only respondents with warm glow incentives, purchasing 
moral satisfaction from the act of giving itself, had thus incentive to contribute higher in the 
charitable auction sessions. Since the amount the charity would be receiving was preset (fixed), 
pure altruists, deriving utility from increases in provision of public goods, had no incentive to 
raise their contribution when a charitable session was employed3.  
Formally, drawing and modifying from the original work of Andreoni (1989), the 
utility function of a pure altruist is ( , )purealtruist purealtruistU u x Y , with altruistpurex  denoting 
individuals consumption of the private good x  and Y  being the total supply of the public good 
as follows: others purealtruistY G g  , where othersG  is  the contributions of all other individuals to 
the public good and purealtruistg  is pure altruist’s own contribution to the public good. A pure 
altruist would thus donate to a charity in order to raise the total contributions and subsequently 
the level of provision of the public good. On the other hand, an individual holding pure warm 
glow incentives cares only for her contribution irrespectively of the level of the public good 
provision: ),( egoistegoistegoist gxuU  . 
If the total contribution to public good Y  is fixed, and thus the amount of the public 
good to be provided is not sensitive to individual’s contribution, a pure altruist will contribute 
nothing. Therefore, in this context, pure altruists should not alter their bidding behaviour in the 
charitable auction treatment for an upgrade from their endowment4. If, however, average bids 
are higher when a charitable auction treatment is employed, this is evidence of warm glow i.e., 
people derive utility from their contribution irrespective of the level of provision of the public 
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good. Thus, the main advantage of this design is its ability to isolate and measure warm glow 
incentives.  
We therefore examine whether bids in the charitable auction treatment (where revenues 
by highest bidders are donated to the charity) are higher than bids in the standard (control) 
auction procedure (where revenues are collected by the experimenter to provide the good). 
Higher WTP estimates in the charitable auction treatment would be evidence of warm glow 
motives5. We also explore whether results are consistent across subject pools (consumers vs. 
students). This is in essence an external validity test of whether it is possible to extrapolate 
results from students to the entire adult population.  
To check respondents understanding of the donation mechanism we asked three test 
questions, two before the auction took place and one at the demographic collection phase. The 
exact questions were: 
“Suppose the highest bidders pay in TOTAL 6€ to exchange their endowed product:  
1. How much money will the HIGHEST BIDDERS donate to the selected NGO?  
2. How much money will be donated in TOTAL (that is, by US the EXPERIMENTERS 
and the HIGHEST BIDDERS)?” 
“Suppose the highest bidders pay in TOTAL 8€ to exchange their endowed product:  
3. How much money in TOTAL (that is, by US the EXPERIMENTERS and the 
HIGHEST BIDDERS) would the NGO receive?” 
Subjects that failed to answer two or more questions were dropped from the subsequent 
analysis which resulted in dismissing observations from two individuals6.  
 
 Experimental Results 
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We first provide a descriptive analysis of our data and proceed with the econometric 
investigation of our treatment variables’ effect on bidding behavior for the two subject pools.  
 
Descriptive analysis 
Simple statistics can help illuminate our research questions. Figure 1 shows mean and median 
bids across rounds, by subject pool and treatments. Solid lines refer to the auctions that 
purported in isolating warm glow (i.e., the charitable auctions) and dashed lines refer to the 
standard auction treatment. Raw data draw a completely different picture for the bidding 
behaviour of each subject pool. The student pool reconfirms what is widely reported in the 
literature: warm glow is evident and subjects derive utility just from the act of giving. Even 
though subjects were aware that their contribution was crowded out by reduced giving by the 
proctor they tend to bid on average twice as much as the control group in every round. A 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test confirms that differences in bids between charitable and 
standard auction treatments are statistically significantly different for the student subject pool 
in each of the five rounds at the 5% level. 
 The consumer subject pool is, however, at complete odds. The warm glow turns “cold” 
with consumers bidding on average less than the control group, a difference which becomes as 
large as €0.3 in round five. A Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test shows that differences in bids 
between charitable and standard auction treatments are not statistically significantly different 
for the consumer subject pool at the 5% level (in each of the five rounds). 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Econometric analysis 
To account for the panel nature of our data, we estimated a random effects regression model for 
each subject pool, as well as for the pooled sample7. Variables in the regression functions are 
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explained in Table 2. We assume bidding behavior to be affected by the treatment variables, 
the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics, the perceived health risks associated with 
consumption of potatoes from areas A and B respectively, as well as potato consumption 
habits. Round dummies are also included in the regression to account for learning effects. 
Formally: 
0 1 2 3 4 2, 5 3, 6 4, 7 5,
8 9 10 2, 11 12 2, 13
14 15 2, 16
it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
it
it it
b b Charity b HealthRisk b TotFee b T b T b T b T
b Age b Gender b Income b Kids b Educ b DangerA
Bid
b NotDangerB b PotatoConsumption b PotatoCon
      
         3,
17 4,
it i
it
it
e u
sumption
b PotatoConsumption
         
(1) 
 
Equation (1) was estimated for each subsample (students, consumers) separately. We 
also estimated a pooled sample regression in which equation (1) was augmented with a dummy 
for sample type (students) and its interaction with the charity dummy (charity x students)8. 
Table 3 displays regression coefficients from the three specifications (students, consumers, 
pooled sample). Note that the coefficients and standard errors of the interacted variables in the 
pooled model (students, charity) take into consideration the coefficient of the interaction term, 
following similar procedures to Drichoutis and Nayga (2011)9.  
[Table 3 here] 
 
Regression coefficients confirm the main findings of the unconditional analysis. Students 
bid on average €0.44 more in the charitable auction compared to the standard auction which is 
a clear evidence of warm glow. On the other hand, consumers in the charitable auction sessions 
bid on average €0.25 less than consumers in the standard auctions, reinforcing the picture of 
figure 1. Note that the coefficient is marginally not significant (p-value=0.106). 
The pooled model reconfirms inferences drawn from the two subsamples. Students that 
participated in the charitable auctions bid on average €0.44 more than students that participated 
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in the standard auction sessions. This corresponds to the difference between the red solid and 
red dashed lines in figure 1. On the other hand, consumers that participated in the charitable 
auctions bid on average €0.29 less than consumers that participated in the standard auctions. 
This corresponds to the difference between the blue solid and blue dashed lines of figure 1.  
Furthermore, results in Table 3 show that consumers  increased bids across rounds by as 
much as 23 cents in round 5. Student subjects did increase their bids as well but by a lower 
amount of money. Gender differences are also evident. Male students bid up to €0.24 less than 
female students which is a common finding in WTP studies and particular in auctions. The 
difference is, however, not significant for the consumer subject pool and the pooled model. 
Income has an economic and statistical significant effect as well. Subjects from households 
with a self-evaluated economic position above average, bid higher by as much as €0.18 in the 
pooled model.  
As expected subjects that perceived consumption of agricultural products from region A to 
pose a high health risk bid more to exchange their endowed products with potatoes from region 
B. Similarly, subjects that perceived region B as posing no health risk bid 0.38€ (pooled 
sample) to 0.43€ (consumer sample) more. Consumption habits of potatoes also have an effect 
on bidding behavior, with subjects consuming potatoes more frequently bidding more to 
upgrade their endowment with potatoes from region B. Other effects in Table 3 are not 
substantial in terms of economic significance. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Student pools are widely used as experimental subjects in laboratory applications. After six 
decades of research in experimental economics, the question on their representativeness and 
consequently on the extent to which results derived from studies with students generalize to the 
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entire adult population is still open, triggering hot debates. This study uses a novel 
experimental design to isolate and examine warm glow motives in charitable auctions and 
offers an external validity test of the possibility to extrapolate results from student pools. We 
find that student subjects drawn from a university population and consumer subjects drawn 
from the general population behaved in a completely opposite direction. The student pool 
verified the presence of warm glow motives behind charitable giving. Students were bidding 
more in an auction that contributed the sum of revenues by highest bidders to a charity, than a 
control group that was bidding in a standard auction. This was so, even though subjects knew 
that their contribution was crowded out by reduced giving by the proctor. Oddly, the consumer 
subject pool was bidding less than the control group. Although previous evidence, based on 
experiments invoking other-regarding considerations, suggests that students are generally more 
selfish and much less generous than subjects from the general population (Belot, Duch, and 
Miller 2010; Carpenter, Connolly, and Myers 2008; Anderson et al. 2010), results from our 
study indicate that students may well exhibit stronger warm glow incentives.  
The present study therefore shows that inferences drawn from a student population are not 
automatically transferable to the general population, even when a methodological issue is 
explored. Students and non-student pools differ in a variety of social, economic and 
demographic dimensions that are likely to influence their experimental behaviour as substantial 
accumulated evidence from experimental studies suggests. Economists, however, use subjects 
drawn from the student population to study a myriad of economic inquiries e.g., the WTP-
WTA gap (Plott and Zeiler 2005; Isoni, Loomes, and Sugden 2010), self-selection bias (Eckel 
and Grossman 2000; Cleave, Nikiforakis and Slonim 2010), information effects (Healy 2009), 
hypothetical bias (Carlsson and Martinsson 2001; Spencer, Swallow and Miller 1998), initial 
endowment effects (Corrigan and Rousu 2006) and warm glow itself (Crumpler and Grossman 
2008; Isaac, Pevnitskaya and Salmon 2010). Whether different subject pools can lead every 
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economic experiment to different inferences is not a generalization we want or can make. We 
further recognize that consumers from western and developed societies, like those participated 
in our experiments, can be as weird as students and therefore claims of universality of our 
results are not intended. The results from this study do urge, in agreement with the concerns 
raised by Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010), for validation of the results drawn from 
WEIRDos using representative and diverse samples before firm conclusions are drawn.  
Finally, we acknowledge that under this design, as Crumpler and Grossman (2008) admit, 
warm glow incentives may be confounded with subjects’ willingness/unwillingness to reduce 
the financial pressure to the proctor. Investigating this issue, Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2011) 
report that under the Crumpler and Grossman (2008) design an upper bound estimate of the 
warm glow is elicited. Since we cannot rule out the possibility of experimenter effects 
influencing our results we adopt a similar restrained interpretation of our measurements on the 
extent of warm glow. We further acknowledge that in the event that different subject pools are 
unevenly affected by experimenter effects, if at all, this may well have influenced our results. 
This is, however, true for all experiments comparing treatment effects between different 
populations. We finally contend that any motivation by students to reciprocate to the 
experimenter would be mitigated by the fact that the proctor (one of the authors) was not their 
professor. 
 
Footnotes 
1. In two of the consumer sessions, subjects were given additional information on the 
higher health risk to which children are exposed, given their longer time span, when 
consuming contaminated agricultural products. The aim of these two sessions was to 
further examine whether consumers respond differently when provided with this extra 
information. Results of this analysis will be reported elsewhere. Although it is out of 
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the scope of this article, a dummy variable indicating whether additional information 
was provided to respondents is included in the econometric analysis to control for 
potential information effects (see table 3). 
2. Endowing both pools with the same compensation would have resulted in students 
receiving a higher, relative to their income, initial amount compared to consumers and 
consequently being more inclined to reciprocate to the experimenter. However, to 
control for the potential effects of this variation in the show-up fees between the two 
subject pools, a variable is included in the econometric analysis. 
3. Although individuals bid for a homegrown value good, revenues to be donated to the 
charity exhibit characteristics of a public good. 
4. Warm glow is a component of the total economic value people attach to a good and 
therefore the demand-revealing properties of the fourth-price Vickrey auction are not 
affected when a charitable auction is applied. 
5. Although we frame our hypothesis as an examination of whether subjects experience 
warm glow from donating to a charity we are not excluding the probability of cold-
glow, i.e., subjects biding less if the revenue is to be donated to charity. 
6. Since no interaction was allowed between individuals, having two confused subjects in 
a session is not expected to have affected the bidding behaviour of the other subjects or 
bias the results of the session when excluding them from the analysis. From the point of 
incentive compatibility of the auction bidders should submit a bid equal to their true 
value even if other subjects don’t. 
7. Subjects submitted only 28 zero bids out of 475 bids in total (95 subjects x 5 rounds), 
indicating that censoring is not likely to be an issue with our data, thus we didn’t pursue 
estimating a censored regression model. 
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8. A likelihood ratio test indicates that the model with the interaction term fits the data 
significantly better than the model without the interaction term ( 2 11.99LR  , p-
value=0.00). We fitted the model with maximum likelihood to be able to perform the 
test. Result tables present standard GLS regressions.  
9. For the Student variable this would be: 
2 3
Bid b b Charity
Student
          (2) 
Expression (2)Error! Reference source not found. can then be evaluated as:  
2 3
1Charity
Bid b b
Student 
     and  20Charity
Bid b
Student 
     (3) 
Similarly for the Charity variable we have: 
1 3
1Student
Bid b b
Charity 
     and  10Student
Bid b
Charity 
     (4) 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Mean and median bids across rounds 
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Tables 
Table 1.  Experimental Design and Number of Subjects by Session 
 Students Consumers 
Charitable auction 
Treatment 
18 29a 
Non-charity (standard 
auction) Treatment 
18 32b 
a15 in the first session and 14 in the second session since two charitable treatments were ran with consumers. Two 
subjects (one per session) were dropped from all subsequent analysis. 
b16 in the first session and 16 in the second session since two non-charitable treatments were ran with consumers. 
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Table 2. Variables Description 
 
Variable Variable description Students Consumers 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Bid Bid to exchange product 0.626 0.628 0.604 0.589 
Charity 
Dummy, 1=Subject participated in 
the charitable auction  
0.500 0.507 0.458 0.502 
Studentsa Dummy, 1=Subject is student Mean: 0.379 SD: 0.488 
HealthRisk 
Dummy, 1=Subject received 
additional health risk information 
regarding children 
- - 0.492 0.504 
TotFee Total money endowment (in euros) 16.917 0.806 22.805 1.531 
Ti Dummy, 1=Round i where i=1 to 5 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 
Age Subject’s age 20.972 1.665 41.508 9.839 
Gender Dummy, 1=male 0.389 0.494 0.305 0.464 
Income 
Dummy, 1=Subject’s household 
economic position is above average 
0.361 0.487 0.475 0.504 
Kids 
Dummy, 1=Subject has  kids under 
18 years old 
- - 0.339 0.477 
Educ 
Dummy, 1= subject is 4th year 
student or higher (for the student 
subject pool) 
0.306 0.467 - - 
Dummy, 1=Subject has a university 
diplomab ( for the consumers subject 
pool) 
- - 0.610 0.492 
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DangerAc 
Dummy, 1=Subject perceives 
consumption of agricultural 
products from region A as being 
dangerous to her health 
0.611 0.494 0.864 0.345 
NotDangerBc 
Dummy, 1=Subject perceives 
consumption of agricultural 
products from region B not being 
dangerous to her health 
0.805 0.401 0.830 0.378 
PotatoConsu
mption1d 
Dummy, 1=Subject consumes 
potatoes 1-2 times/month or less 
0.083 0.280 0.153 0.363 
PotatoConsu
mption2 
Dummy, 1=Subject consumes 
potatoes 1 time/week 
0.222 0.421 0.186 0.393 
PotatoConsu
mption3 
Dummy, 1=Subject consumes 
potatoes 2-3 times/week 
0.527 0.506 0.441 0.501 
PotatoConsu
mption4 
Dummy, 1=Subject consumes 
potatoes 4-5 times/week or more 
often 
0.166 0.378 0.220 0.418 
a Only applicable to the pooled model. 
bThis is the definition used in the pooled model as well. 
cThese were measured on 7-point Likert scales and were dummy coded for the analysis 
dExcluded from estimations to avoid perfect multi-collinearity 
 
 
29 
 
Table 3. Results from Random Effects Regression Models 
 
  Pooled sample 
Consumer subject 
pool 
Student subject 
pool 
  Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error
Constant  2.329** 1.087 1.769 1.267 4.677** 1.854 
Charity 
Student=1 0.443** 0.172 
-0.251 0.155 0.441*** 0.138 
Student=0 -0.297** 0.139 
Students 
Charity=1 -0.157 0.357 
- - - - 
Charity=0 -0.897** 0.372 
HealthRisk  -0.148 0.137 -0.208 0.148 - - 
TotFee  -0.098** 0.042 -0.073 0.050 -0.207** 0.098 
T2  0.074*** 0.027 0.058* 0.033 0.098** 0.046 
T3  0.131*** 0.027 0.149*** 0.033 0.103** 0.046 
T4  0.157*** 0.027 0.189*** 0.033 0.104** 0.046 
T5  0.194*** 0.027 0.236*** 0.033 0.125*** 0.046 
Age  0.003 0.007 0.005 0.008 -0.083 0.060 
Gender  -0.159 0.113 -0.094 0.171 -0.243* 0.146 
Income2  0.182* 0.107 0.235 0.146 0.033 0.146 
Educ2  -0.037 0.142 0.007 0.155 0.216 0.209 
Kids  - - -0.068 0.168 - - 
DangerA  0.238* 0.137 0.079 0.236 0.404*** 0.137 
NotDangerB  0.388*** 0.143 0.436** 0.209 0.429** 0.174 
PotatoConsumption.2  0.386** 0.195 0.392 0.275 0.512* 0.277 
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PotatoConsumption3  -0.024 0.176 -0.170 0.241 0.356 0.243 
PotatoConsumption4  0.126 0.192 -0.004 0.251 0.656** 0.303 
R-squared  0.288 0.278 0.550 
Note: ***, **, * = Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
This table presents several conditional marginal effects. For example, “Charity, Student=1” refers to the effect of 
Charity conditional on Student taking the value of 1. In other words, “Charity, Student =1” captures the difference 
between the charitable and non-charitable auction treatments for the student subject pool. Likewise, “Student, 
Charity=1” refers to the difference between the student and consumer subject pool in the charitable auction 
treatments. 
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Appendix 
 
A. Environmental Health Risk information 
 
Environmental profile of region A 
Region A is characterized by intensive industrial activity, with many of the industries not 
fulfilling the safety standards, and intensive agricultural activity. Underground water analysis 
has revealed the presence of heavy metals, such as chromium and nickel, which may have 
contaminated plants through irrigation. The severity of these substances for human health 
depends on the degree and the duration of the exposure. However, an epidemiological study 
assessing accurately the risks for human health from the consumption of agricultural products 
from region A, has not been performed yet. In addition, with respect to potatoes heavy metals 
tend to accumulate in the skin of potatoes and not in the interion that is commonly consumed. 
 
Environmental profile of region B 
Region B is classified as in good ecological status, according to the European Water 
Framework Directive. The good ecological status guarantees that pollution loads are minor 
such that there is no risk for human health and aquatic life. The agricultural sector follows 
good agricultural and environmental practices and there is no industrial activity in the area. 
Measurements in potatoes from the area revealed that the accumulation in heavy metals is far 
below the international safety levels. 
 
 
 
B. Environmental Organizations 
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1. ARCTUROS  
ARCTUROS is an Environmental, Non Governmental, non profit organization that was 
founded in 1992 for the protection and management of wildlife and natural environment. To 
achieve its goals the organization is undertaking field activities, conducting scientific research, 
awareness campaigns, environmental training, promoting volunteerism for the protection of 
wildlife and the empowerment of biodiversity and sustainability in [country removed for peer 
review]and abroad.   
2. MOM  
MOM, is a non-profit non-governmental organisation (NGO) the Study and Protection of the 
Monk Seal that is supported by more than 6,500 members in [removed for peer review] and 
internationally. Its activities target the conservation of the critically endangered marine 
mammal, the Mediterranean Monk Seal Monachus monachus and its marine and coastal 
habitats.  
3. PELAGOS  
The Pelagos Cetacean Research Institute is a scientific, non-profit and non-governmental 
organization that works for the development of cetacean research aiming at the conservation of 
dolphins, whales, seals and their natural habitat in [country removed for peer review]and the 
Mediterranean Sea.   
 
4. Plant-a-Tree.gr  
33 
 
Plant-a-Tree.gr is a young company that provides tree planting and envisages the raising of 
environmental awareness of [removed for peer review], being people, unions, or industries, 
towards initiatives that will ‘green’ their city.  
 
5. WWF 
WWF [country removed for peer review] is part of the international WWF family, which 
consists of 50 National Organizations and works for the protection of the environment in more 
than 100 countries. WWF’s mission is to conserve the rich biodiversity of [country removed 
for peer review], to prevent and eventually to reverse environmental degradation, seeking the 
harmonious coexistence of humans with nature.  
6. MEDITERRANEAN SOS Network 
MEDITERRANEAN SOS Network is an environmental and social Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) of non-profit character. The Network is active since 1990 for the 
protection of the natural and cultural wealth of the Mediterranean, paying particular attention 
to the protection of coasts and the sea and their sustainable management, the protection of bio-
diversity, sustainable management of energy, water resources and waste, protection of global 
climate and last but not least diminishing the nuclear threat. 
 
